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Abstract
As companies start using deep learning to provide value to
their customers, the demand for solutions to protect the own-
ership of trained models becomes evident. Several water-
marking approaches have been proposed for protecting dis-
criminative models. However, rapid progress in the task of
photorealistic image synthesis, boosted by Generative Adver-
sarial Networks (GANs), raises an urgent need for extending
protection to generative models.
We propose the first watermarking solution for GAN mod-
els. We leverage steganography techniques to watermark
GAN training dataset, transfer the watermark from the dataset
to GAN models, and then verify the watermark from gener-
ated images. In the experiments, we show that the hidden
encoding characteristic of steganography allows preserving
generation quality and supports the watermark secrecy against
steganalysis attacks. We validate that our watermark verifi-
cation is robust in wide ranges against several image pertur-
bations. Critically, our solution treats GAN models as an
independent component: watermark embedding is agnostic
to GAN details and watermark verification relies only on
accessing the APIs of black-box GANs.
We further extend our watermarking applications to gener-
ated image detection and attribution, which delivers a prac-
tical potential to facilitate forensics against deep fakes and
responsibility tracking of GAN misuse.
1 Introduction
Deep Learning (DL) techniques, ranging from discriminative
models [54, 46, 77, 81, 35] to generative models [45, 31,
69, 62, 44, 42, 9, 43], have achieved great success in many
applications. They are now widely used and industrially de-
ployed in part due to the availability of many open-source
development infrastructures including Caffe [40], Theano [7],
Torch [19], PyTorch [67], Chainer [84], and Tensorflow [1],
that accelerated progress. Furthermore, academic and indus-
trial researchers often publicize their state-of-the-art models’
Figure 1: An overview of our black-box GAN watermarking
solution.
implementations for function reproduction, which contributed
to the dissemination of the latest results and advances.
As a result of this rapid progress and its availability, Ma-
chine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) has rapidly become a
popular and profitable business (e.g., Amazon AWS ML [51],
Microsoft Azure ML [53], Google Cloud AI [3], and IBM
Watson ML [52]). However, training a commercial-level DL
model is not a trivial task as it requires a large-scale dataset
(e.g., ImageNet [22], CelebA [59], LSUN [92]), powerful
computing resources (e.g., 8 NVIDIA Tesla V100 GPUs,
$8,000 each), in addition to significant DL expertise. It usu-
ally takes days up to weeks for training and requires an even
longer time for many trial-and-error iterations on algorithm
design, model architecture selection, and hyper-parameter
search.
On the other hand, as DL models are difficult to train while
easy to access, they become vulnerable to adversaries. Adver-
saries can redistribute an existing model with little effort and
in turn provide a plagiarized DL service without citing or ac-
knowledging the model owner. Such copyright infringement
encroaches on the owner’s credits and scoops the commercial
potentials from the owner. In this sense, it becomes neces-
sary and urgent to propose solutions for model Intellectual
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Property (IP) protection, i.e., model ownership verification.
1.1 Model watermarking
As protecting models from copying, extraction, or stealing
(even with limiting the access to black-box APIs) is chal-
lenging [65, 85], the commonly used defense against stealing
models is model watermarking. This enables the identifica-
tion of a stolen model and, thus, the verification of ownership,
similar to IP legal protection of patents, trademarks, and copy-
right licenses [80, 48, 74].
The model watermarking procedure is composed of two
phases: embedding and detection, and can be differentiated
into two categories: black-box watermarking [2, 97] and
white-box watermarking [86, 12, 21]. The embedding phase
is to embed identification information into the model without
affecting its utility. That identification information is called
a watermark, which is provided by the owner and secret to
others including potential adversaries.
In black-box watermarking, it is unnecessary to manipulate
the model weights. Instead, the watermark is embedded as a
special input-output behavior (similar to trigger sets in back-
dooring [32, 2]). A small set of inputs is selected and assigned
with desirably unrelated outputs. Such special pairs are mixed
with normal training pairs to train the model accordingly. The
ownership of a watermarked model is detected based on the
assumption that only with a very small probability a non-
watermarked model can demonstrate the same behavior. In
white-box watermarking, it is required to access the model
weights. Then the watermark is explicitly embedded as part
of the weight distributions using an invertible transformation.
During detection, the weights are transformed back and com-
pared to the watermark. Black-box watermarking has the
advantage of not requiring the white-box access to the model
weights which is a more realistic scenario as attackers are not
likely to publicize the stolen models [97].
GANs. Unfortunately, the studies of aforementioned pro-
tection are limited to the discriminative models [54, 46, 77,
81, 35], e.g., classification tasks, where the models map from
image domain to class probability domain. To the best of
our knowledge, the protection for the other prominent DL
models, the generative models [45, 31, 69, 62, 44, 42, 9, 43],
is surprisingly lacking.
Generative models aim to synthesize photorealistic images,
mapping from noise vector domain to image domain. In
particular, Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) tech-
niques [31, 9, 43] have significantly pushed the edge of gen-
erated realism to a brand-new level, and have facilitated a
variety of applications: image synthesis [31, 69, 33, 44, 9,
43], semantic image synthesis [66], super resolution [55], im-
age attribute editing [15], text to image synthesis [96, 95],
image to image translation [39, 103, 102], inpainting [93] and
semi-supervised learning [78]. Open-source tool DeOldify
[4] is a remarkable example of using GANs in image en-
hancement for colorizing and restoring old images and film
footage.
Three key challenges. However, the development of wa-
termarking solutions for GANs is lagged far behind their
prevalence. It still urgently remains an open question of how
to apply GAN watermarking. We identify three key chal-
lenges:
First, in discriminative models, there is a control over the
input that would work as a trigger set for backdoor water-
marking. In contrast, GANs require random sampling in the
input domain which has to follow a natural prior distribution,
e.g., a standard normal distribution. There is no control or
pairing between noise vectors and generated images as this is
learned in an unsupervised adversarial manner. Any specifi-
cation on the pairs of noise and generated image gets biases
from the natural prior distribution and impairs the entire gen-
eration fidelity, according to the practical disadvantage of
VAE-GAN [49].
Second, in discriminative models, the outputs associated
with the trigger set are assigned to a special target during
supervised training. However, GANs are trained using only
the unsupervised adversarial loss to approximate between two
distributions which makes it difficult to assign a desirable
special output for a trigger set. In addition, the image output
domain of GANs is highly structured and full of semantics,
making the output specification even more difficult to achieve.
Third, GAN training is known to be unstable due to its
min-max formulation and alternation between gradient as-
cent/descent. Adding an auxiliary regularization term to the
GAN objective could further amplify the training instabil-
ity. Unlike watermarking for discriminative models [2, 98]
where the original objective and the watermarking term are
both reconstruction-based, any reconstructive auxiliary reg-
ularization cannot easily cooperate with the adversarial loss,
according to the practical disadvantage of VAE-GAN [49].
These three challenges together imply to watermark a GAN
without modifying the adversarial training. We, therefore,
propose a black-box watermarking scheme. We sidestep from
controlling the input-output behavior of GANs. In addition to
its benefits in avoiding GAN training instability, a black-box
solution better adheres to practical scenarios where we only
have access to the stolen model APIs.
GAN watermarking and deep fakes. In addition to GAN
model ownership verification, watermarking the output of
GAN models is closely related to tracing the provenance of
generated images (i.e., deep fakes) and attributing them to
their respective GAN models [94, 89]. With the rapid ongoing
progress [44, 42, 43], GANs learn to better match the target
distribution which raises concerns about the future trajecto-
ries and misuse of powerful GANs [89, 23, 26, 6]. GAN
watermarking can contribute to identifying watermarked gen-
erations from real images, and tracking responsibility in case
of misuse (e.g., when the service is offered to different entities
with different watermarks). Besides, models owners would
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be motivated to cooperate with DL model administration plat-
forms and watermark their models, in order to avoid liability
for the potential misuse of their models. However, for this to
be satisfied, the watermark should be verifiable from all or
arbitrary outputs of the GAN model instead of a response to a
specific trigger set (as typically used in discriminative model
watermarking). Therefore, our GAN watermarking solution
abandons the trigger set approach and aims to watermark all
generated images.
1.2 Approach and contributions
To this end, we present the first black-box watermarking so-
lution for GANs that we show in Figure 1. Unlike existing
techniques that are only applicable to discriminative models,
we propose to leverage steganography approaches [5, 83] to
watermark the GAN training dataset, transfer the watermark
from the dataset to the GAN model, and then verify the water-
mark from generated images. The model owner queries the
APIs of a suspicious model and uses a pre-trained decoder to
detect the watermark. If the detected watermark matches the
owner’s watermark, it should form convincing legal evidence
against the pirate. In addition, the watermark helps to identify
generated images from real images and attribute them to their
respective watermarked GANs.
Image steganography meets GAN watermarking. We
differentiate between two important concepts: image
steganography and model watermarking. Steganography aims
to embed watermarks into images rather than networks, al-
though sometimes the embedding and detection procedures
are implemented by networks. Steganography is one way of
protecting the IP of watermarked images, rather than models.
We elaborate on the differences between these two concepts
in Sections 2.1 and 2.3. We summarize the benefits of our ap-
proach of using image steganography (applied on the training
dataset) to watermark GANs as follows:
1. It is a black-box watermarking solution that does not
require access to GAN weights. It satisfies the practical
scenario where the generation service usually publicizes
only the APIs but not the model weights to users.
2. We leverage the secrecy and hidden encoding character-
istics of steganography to guarantee the original genera-
tion performance.
3. It minimizes the possible incompatibility against GAN
training by putting GAN in an independent component:
it does not modify the original GAN training protocols,
e.g., objective, network architecture, and optimization
strategy. It acts as a plug-and-play watermarking pre-
processing disentangled from GAN training and agnostic
to GAN details.
4. As the watermark can be detected from all GAN gen-
erations (not a trigger set response), our solution offers
a way for tracing the responsibility of a watermarked
GAN. This provides legal clues for malicious use cases
of fake images. Our watermarking scheme increases
the margin between real and fake images. It facilitates
image forensics to separate real from fake images via
extrinsic information (the watermark), considering real
images are deterministically non-watermarked.
Contributions. Based on the above formulation, we sum-
marize our contributions as follows:
1. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to
formalize the problem of watermarking GAN models.
2. We empirically validate the effectiveness of our GAN
watermarking solution. GANs learn the watermark from
the dataset and deliver it to the generated images. As
a result, it bridges the transferability between dataset
watermarking and GAN model watermarking.
3. We further conduct comprehensive analysis to validate
the fidelity, robustness, secrecy, and large capacity of
our solution. In addition, we demonstrate the advanta-
geous performance in two applications: generated image
detection and image-to-GAN attribution.
2 Related work
In this section, we summarize the related work in the field in-
cluding discriminative model watermarking, GANs, steganog-
raphy, steganalysis, data poisoning, and GAN fingerprints.
2.1 Watermarking for discriminative models
We summarize previous watermarking works that focused on
discriminative models. Based on the accessibility to model
weights, they are typically categorized into white-box and
black-box ones.
White-box watermarking. These methods require access
to model weights or intermediate activations to perform own-
ership verification. Uchida et al. [86] proposed the first at-
tempt to transform and embed watermarks into discriminative
models weights via training regularization term, resulting
in a white-box case. DeepMarks [12] and DeepSigns [21]
have a similar flavor. They embed watermarks in the prob-
ability density function of model weights by leveraging the
low probabilistic regions while minimizing the side effect to
the classification accuracy and training overhead. White-box
watermarking has limited use cases because the suspicious
models are usually deployed remotely, and the plagiarized
service would not publicize the parameters.
Black-box watermarking. In contrast, these methods do
not require access to model weights and other details, e.g.,
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architecture and training strategy. [2, 97, 50] embed water-
marks in the input-output behavior of discriminative mod-
els; designing a specific trigger input set and associating it
with specific class labels. Similarly, [57] focuses on mak-
ing images in the trigger set visually indistinguishable from
those in the regular set. Also, [82] embeds the watermark
in predictions in order to defend against model extractions
by APIs, by dynamically changing the responses for a small
subset of queries. To address ambiguity attacks, [27] links
the performance of a network with the presence of the correct
watermark and substitutes the verification process with model
fidelity evaluation.
However, previous protection studies are limited to discrim-
inative models. To the best of our knowledge, the protection
for the other prominent deep learning models, generative mod-
els, is surprisingly lacking. Our paper is the first to treat GANs
as victim models and target IP protection of them.
2.2 Generative adversarial networks (GANs)
Photorealistic image generation can be viewed as the problem
of sampling from the probability distribution of real-world
images. To leverage the expressive power of deep learning,
the sampling procedure is chosen to be a deep generative
neural network with random noise as input. Training the gen-
erative model aims to approximate the generated distribution
towards the real image distribution. This is challenging be-
cause the real image distribution is unknown and does not
have a tractable distribution expression. GANs [31] introduce
a workaround by formulating distribution approximation as
a real/fake classification problem. GANs consist of two neu-
ral networks, a generator and a discriminator. The generator
takes random noise as input and is trained to generate images
as realistic as possible, while the discriminator receives im-
ages from both the generator and real dataset and is trained
to differentiate the two sources. During training, these two
networks compete and evolve simultaneously. GANs have
significantly pushed the edge of generation realism to a brand-
new level [69, 33, 44, 9, 43]. Successes in image domain
have led to applications of GANs in many tasks, e.g., [66, 55,
15, 96, 95, 39, 93, 78].
However, the development of IP protection of GANs is
lagged far behind the prevalence of GANs. It still urgently
remains an open question how to apply watermarking pro-
tection to GANs, due to the three main challenges discussed
in Section 1: the uncontrollable randomness of GANs input
domain, the highly semantic structures of GANs output do-
main, and the unstable training. We propose to sidestep these
challenges and present the first GAN watermarking solution.
2.3 Image steganography
We differentiate between two important concepts: image
steganography and model watermarking (Section 2.1). Image
steganography represents a technique to hide information into
carrier images in the initial purpose of covert communica-
tion [28]. It can also play a role in protecting the IP of carrier
images if the hidden information is used as a watermark to
verify the ownership of images [63, 88]. Although sometimes
a steganography procedure is implemented by a network, it is
never used nor directly able to hide information into a network
and protect its IP.
Steganography has the advantage that the secret informa-
tion is not obviously visible and its existence will not be sus-
pected [60]. It avoids attracting the attention of adversaries
and is subject to more control in an encrypted environment.
Zero-bit steganography techniques [20, 10] modify the pixels
of an image so that its Fourier transform lies in the cone with
an owner defined direction. Least significant bit methods [68,
37, 38] hide information into images by minimizing the vi-
sual changes of image appearance. They distort information
and fit it in the regions with more complex contexts, so as
to make the traces less detectable. Several works proposed
to substitute manually crafted hiding procedures with neural
network embedding. [5, 34, 88, 99] use an encoder network
to embed information in the latent space and use a decoder to
detect that information from an image. [101] leverage data
augmentation to improve the robustness of the two networks
against perturbations such as blur, noise, crop, and JPEG com-
pression. [83] presents a pipeline to detect hyperlinks from
printed pictures. [98] releases an open-source implementation
of a steganography system for hiding text messages inside
high-resolution images. [76, 87] use GANs to generate cover
images that improve the performance of steganography meth-
ods. [90] directly generates steganographic images without
cover images.
We propose to leverage steganography approaches [5, 83]
to watermark images in the GAN training dataset, then trans-
fer the watermark from the dataset to the GAN model, and
then detect the watermark from generated images. We take
advantage of the secrecy characteristic of steganography to
preserve the original generation performance. We separate
the steganography procedure from GAN training to minimize
the possible incompatibility between the two.
2.4 Image steganalysis
With the ever-growing advancements in steganography tech-
niques, there has been equitable growth of research on
steganalysis techniques as well, as a countermeasure for
steganography. Image steganalysis techniques are proposed to
prevent the transmission of secret information through images.
Binary steganalysis typically solves the binary classification
problem of whether or not there exists hidden information in
an image. Spatial Rich Model [29] extracts spatial correla-
tion information of high-frequency residuals of images and
uses these features to train a binary classifier. [56] trains a
classifier using an artificial training set, which is formed by
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applying the targeted steganographic algorithm to the testing
data. Then the classifier aims to differentiate between images
on which the steganographic algorithm was applied once and
those on which it was applied twice. [91] is the first to use
neural networks for both feature extraction and binary clas-
sification. See [64, 41] for a comprehensive review of the
development of binary steganalysis.
Though the binary steganalysis can help stall the illicit and
unwanted communications, quantitative steganalysis endeav-
ors to go beyond this identification and aims to dig out more
information about the hidden message through various inves-
tigative steps and finally reconstruct the secret message [30].
Machine learning paradigms such as logistic regression [104],
ensemble framework [18], extreme learning machines [17],
and neural networks [13] have been used for quantitative
steganalysis and hidden message regression. See [16] for a
comprehensive review of quantitative steganalysis.
Image steganalysis techniques can also be used by adver-
saries to examine images and detect watermarks. We consider
this as a possible attack in our threat model in Section 3.1 and
employ [56] to test the secrecy of our GAN watermarking
solution in Section 4.2.3.
2.5 Data poisoning
Several works study the use of training data to influence the
behavior of discriminative models during test time. Data poi-
soning attacks [8, 79, 75] target to maliciously add a few
data points to the training set, such that the trained model
has to predict an unrelated label chosen by an adversary on
particular samples. Backdoor attacks [14, 32] add into a class
unrelated training samples with a trigger pattern; at test time,
any sample with the same trigger will be classified in this
class regardless of its semantics ground truth. In a similar
spirit, [73] introduces imperceptible but “radioactive” pertur-
bations into training data, such that any model trained on it
will bear an identifiable mark. This is an effective example
to show the transferability of identification information from
training data to discriminative models. Inspired by its flavor
but beyond that, we validate in this paper the transferability
of image steganographic effect from training data to GANs,
from a constructive perspective to protect the IP of generative
models.
2.6 GAN fingerprints and deep fake detection
Images generated by GANs intrinsically bear unique finger-
prints. [61] shows that GANs leave unique noise residuals to
generated samples, which facilitate real/fake detection. [94]
moves one step further, using a neural network classifier to at-
tribute different images to their sources including a real-world
source and various GAN sources. They show that it is even
possible to finely differentiate samples from GANs which
only differ in random seeds used for training. [89] also trains
a classifier and improves testing generalization ability across
different generator domains. [100, 25, 24] show that GAN
fingerprints are embedded in the high-frequency region of a
spectrum, and [58] shows that fingerprints are recognizable
from texture features.
Different from all these studies where attribution accuracy
has to be contingent on the strengths and distinguishability
of intrinsic fingerprints, we propose a watermarking solution
that artificially embeds distinctive watermarks into GANs
in an owner-controllable manner. It has an advantage that
the margin between real and watermarked fake is amplified
(Section 4.3), and ownership attribution is more accurately
validated (Section 4.4).
3 Black-box GAN watermarking
We present the first black-box GAN watermarking approach
that extends model watermarking beyond discriminative mod-
els. We first present our threat model and summarize five
qualifications of a desirable watermarking solution in Sec-
tion 3.1. Then we establish the watermarking pipeline in
Section 3.2.
3.1 Threat model
In our analysis, we consider two threats: piracy and GAN
misuse. In piracy, we consider a model owner and an ad-
versary. The model owner invests resources into training a
GAN model G and uses it to offer a generation service s to
customers. The adversary pirates the well-trained G from the
owner to obtain G′, and offers a similar service s′. Model
piracy can be done via a malware attack or with the help of an
insider. To detect piracy, in the white-box scenario verifying
G≈ G′ should be sufficient. But white-box is not a practical
assumption because the adversary usually does not publicize
the model weights. Therefore, in this paper, we consider the
more practical black-box scenario where only s′ (i.e., the out-
put of G′) is accessible to the owner. But verifying s≈ s′ is
not sufficient evidence of piracy because all generators ideally
approximate their services towards the same real dataset dis-
tribution. In the second threat, the adversary uses generated
images from a well-trained GAN (that could be offered by
a black-box service) for malicious purposes, e.g., a possible
flood of fake multimedia.
Therefore, in the black-box scenario and as shown in Fig-
ure 1, the owner seeks a watermarking solution by embedding
a secret watermark w to G and obtains a watermarked model
Gw that produces a generation service sw. This helps the
owner to prove ownership and, by cooperating with DL model
administration platforms, to avoid the liability for potential
misuse. Also, it helps to track the responsibility of misuse, if
the service is distributed to different entities with different wa-
termarks. Besides, it contributes to the visual forensics efforts
by introducing an imperceptible, yet verifiable, watermark
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in the generated images that facilitates its identification from
real images. We formalize five qualifications for a desirable
GAN watermarking system as follows:
1. Effectiveness. At the owner’s end, an arbitrary water-
mark w in a given form can be embedded into a GAN
model G and should be accurately detected from sw, the
generated images of a watermarked model Gw. The de-
tection should not depend on the access to the weights of
Gw, so as to abide by the black-box scenario in reality.
2. Fidelity. To preserve the utility of the service, a wa-
termarked generator Gw should provide a comparable
service and generation quality to that of the original
generator G, i.e., s ≈ sw. In addition, this avoids the
adversary’s suspect of the existence of a watermark, and
therefore, avoids the counter-efforts that decrypt or re-
move the owner’s watermark from the stolen service.
3. Secrecy. To avoid attacks that aim to remove the wa-
termark and hinder its verification, the presence of the
watermark w should not be easily detected by the adver-
sary. This requires the watermark to be secret enough
under the adversary’s steganalysis techniques.
4. Robustness. Regardless of the secrecy of the watermark,
the adversary may always apply perturbation attacks to
the generated images s′w. Therefore, at the owner end,
the watermark should always be robustly detected from
s′w given a possible range of perturbations (e.g., noise,
blurring, JPEG compression, and cropping).
5. Capacity. The watermarking solution should have a
large enough capacity to embed a large amount of in-
formation and maintain a large number of distinctive
watermarks for different GAN models.
3.2 Watermarking pipeline
We model our watermarking solution such that it satisfies
the previously mentioned qualifications. We demonstrate in
Figure 2 the pipeline that consists of four stages, and describe
it below in details.
3.2.1 Watermark encoder-decoder training
To embed the watermark into the GAN training dataset, we
train an image steganography system on the owner side. The
use of steganography techniques meets the fidelity and se-
crecy qualification of a desired watermarking system because
it minimizes the effect on the generation quality and keeps
the watermark hidden. The system is similar in spirit to [5,
83] and it consists of a jointly trained encoder-decoder ar-
chitecture; the encoder is trained to imperceptibly embed an
arbitrary watermark into arbitrary images, while the decoder
Figure 2: The four stages of our GAN watermarking pipeline.
The first and third stages are in the training mode, while the
second and fourth stages are in the inference mode.
is trained to detect that watermark. The watermark is rep-
resented as a sequence of n binary bits. n should be large
enough to avoid a collision in a large space of all possible
watermarks, meeting the capacity qualification.
The encoder E combines a cover image x and a randomly
sampled binary watermark w as input, and maps them to a
stego image x˜: E(x,w) 7→ x˜. The stego image has the same
size as that of the cover image and should be perceptually
similar to it, i.e., x≈ x˜. The decoder D takes the stego image
x˜ as input and aims to reconstruct watermark: D(x˜) 7→ w˜ and
desirably w˜ ≈ w. We achieve the above by jointly training
the encoder and decoder w.r.t. the following objective:
min
E,D
Ex∼real,w∼{0,1}nLBCE(x,w;E,D)+λLMSE(x,w;E) (1)
LBCE(x,w;E,D) =
1
n
n
∑
k=1
(wk log w˜k +(1−wk) log(1− w˜k))
(2)
LMSE(x,w;E) = ||E(x,w)−x||22 (3)
w˜ = D(E(x,w)) (4)
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where wk and w˜k are the kth bits of the watermarks w and
w˜ separately; and λ is a hyper-parameter to balance the two
objective terms. The binary cross-entropy term LBCE guides
the decoder to decode whatever binary watermark sequence
that is embedded by the encoder. The mean squared error
term LMSE penalizes any deviation of the stego image x˜ from
the original cover image x.
3.2.2 Watermark embedding to GAN training dataset
The second stage is the inference mode of the first stage after
the training of encoder and decoder converges. The owner
defines a watermark and uses the encoder to embed it into
each real image of the GAN training dataset. By this stage,
the watermark appears in the carrier of images.
3.2.3 GAN training with the watermarked dataset
Our watermarking solution is motivated by not introducing
instability to the GAN training, for the purpose of preserving
the utility. Therefore, it is independent of GAN training,
agnostic to all its details, and acts as a plug-and-play pre-
processing. In the third stage, the owner trains a GAN model
in the original manner using the watermarked dataset. We
assume by this stage that the watermark can be effectively
transferred from training images to the generations of the
GAN model. If this holds, the owner can trustingly publicize
the model which has been imperceptibly watermarked. We
call it a watermarked GAN. We empirically validate it meets
the effectiveness qualification in Section 4.2.1.
3.2.4 Watermark verification
The fourth stage is the inference mode of the third stage. The
owner performs the watermark verification to either prove
ownership to a suspicious GAN model or track the responsi-
bility of distributed models in case of misuse. To be qualified
in practice, we model for the black-box scenario where the
owner does not require access to the GAN weights. The
owner only needs to have a generated image x′ (the misused
image or a one obtained by the APIs queries), and detects its
watermark w′ = D(x′) using the well-trained decoder from
the first stage. Then the owner compares the detected water-
mark w′ to the original watermark w, and observes k matching
bits. Instead of exact matching, we verify the watermark by
hypothesis testing given the number of matching bits (where
the null hypothesis is getting these matching bits by chance).
As we validate in Section 4.2.4, this is sufficient for the de-
tection of the watermark even after applying perturbations to
the generated images. As a result, it meets the robustness
qualification.
In specific, we consider two hypotheses:
H0 : w′ 6=w,some bits are matching due to random coincidence;
H1 : w′ ≈ w
Under the null hypothesis H0, the probability of the number
of matching bits, denoted as the random variable K, follows a
binomial distribution with n= dim(w) trials and 0.5 probabil-
ity of success. Given the observation of k matching bits, the
owner computes the p-value, the probability of the extreme
cases where there are k or even more matching bits under H0.
p = Pr(K ≥ k|H0) =
n
∑
i=k
(
n
i
)
0.5n (5)
The watermark verification holds if and only if the p-value
is smaller than a small threshold τ, which corresponds to the
situation where k is larger than a large threshold κ. In another
word, if the owner observes a large number of matching bits,
it is very unlikely to accept the null hypothesis H0, meaning
to instead accept H1 that w′ and w match. In Section 4.2.1
we do not explicitly set τ. Rather, we derive how to set
up a reasonable threshold κ and validate, by this stage, the
transferability of the presence of watermark from training
dataset to GAN model, which can then be verified by the
generated images.
4 Experiments
The goal of this section is to validate the five qualifications of
our black-box watermarking solution (Sections 4.2.2-4.2.5).
Sections 4.3 and 4.4 show that watermarking is beneficial
to solve two tasks related to digital forensics: detection and
attribution of generated images.
4.1 Implementation details
Encoder. The encoder is trained to embed a watermark into
a cover image while minimizing the perceptual differences
between the input and stego images. We follow the technical
details proposed in [83]. The watermark binary vector is first
passed through a fully-connected layer and then reshaped as
a tensor with one channel dimension and with the same spa-
tial dimension of the cover image. We then concatenate this
watermark tensor and the image along the channel dimension
as the input to a U-Net [72] style architecture. The output
of the encoder, the stego image, has the same size as that of
the cover image. Note that passing the watermark through
a fully-connected layer allows for every bit of the binary se-
quence to be encoded over the entire spatial dimensions of the
cover image and flexible to the coverage image size. In our
experiments, the image size is set to 128×128×3 without
losing representativeness. The watermark length is set to 100
as suggested in [83]. The length of 100 binary bits leads to
a large enough space for watermark design as well as does
not deteriorate the original performance perceptually. We
visualize the encoder architecture in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Encoder architecture.
Figure 4: Decoder architecture.
Decoder. The decoder is trained to recover the hidden wa-
termark from the stego image. We follow the technical details
proposed in [83]. It consists of a series of convolutional lay-
ers with kernel size 3x3 and strides ≥ 1, dense layers, and a
sigmoid output activation to produce a final output with the
same length as the watermark binary vector. We visualize the
encoder architecture in Figure 4.
Encoder and decoder training. The encoder and decoder
are jointly trained end-to-end w.r.t. the objective in Eq. 1. We
randomly sample watermark binary vectors and embed them
to the images from either MNIST digit dataset [54] (60,000
training images and 10,000 testing images), CelebA face
dataset [59] (150,000 train images and 50,000 testing im-
ages) or LSUN bedroom dataset [92] (50,000 training images
and 50,000 testing images). The encoder is trained to balance
watermark reconstruction and image reconstruction. At the
beginning of training, we set λ = 0 to focus on watermark
reconstruction, otherwise watermarks cannot be accurately
embedded into cover images. After the watermark detection
accuracy achieves 95% (that takes 3-5 epochs), we increase
λ linearly up to 10 within 3,000 iterations to shift our focus
more on cover image reconstruction. We train the encoder
and decoder for 30 epochs in total. Given the batch size of
64, it takes 3 hours using 1 NVIDIA Tesla V100 GPU with
16GB memory.
Victim GAN models. One of the advantages of our water-
marking solution is to disentangle watermarking from GAN
training and put GAN details in an independent component.
Therefore, without losing representativeness, we selected two
milestone works of GAN techniques, DCGAN [69] and Pro-
GAN [44], as the victim GAN models for watermark em-
bedding and detection. Model training is implemented in
PyTorch in a way agnostic to watermarking and equivalent
to official implementations on GitHub [70, 71]. In order to
obtain corresponding watermarked GAN, model training is
run with our watermarked MNIST digit dataset, watermarked
CelebA face dataset, or watermarked LSUN bedroom dataset.
4.2 Qualifications of our GAN watermarking
In this section, we design comprehensive experiments to eval-
uate our GAN watermarking solution w.r.t. the five desirable
qualifications formalized in Section 3.1: effectiveness, fi-
delity, security, robustness, and capacity. We discuss different
evaluation metrics, compared baseline methods, and/or analy-
sis studies for each qualification, if applicable, to validate the
advantages and/or working ranges of our solution.
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Figure 5: Histograms of watermark bitwise accuracy given
positive (red) or negative samples (blue). They are evaluated
on ProGAN on CelebA. The positive samples are gener-
ated by the owner’s watermarked GAN model. The negative
samples are either from the real world, or generated by a
non-watermarked GAN model or by another watermarked
GAN model different from the owner’s. We can perceive a
significant margin to distinguish the two distributions, which
validates the 99.67% precision of our solution.
4.2.1 Effectiveness
At the owner’s end, the effectiveness of the watermark verifi-
cation, i.e., the capability of embedding arbitrary watermarks
into a GAN model and detecting them in a black-box scenario
(only from generated images), is the key qualification. If we
validate this, we can also empirically redeem our assumptions
in Sec 3.2 into important discoveries: the transferability of the
presence of watermark from training images to GAN model
and then to generated images.
Evaluations. In our experiments, the effectiveness is suc-
cessively evaluated by two types of performance: precision
and recall. The definitions in this paper are different from
those in the traditional classification tasks. Here precision
measures the classification accuracy of whether or not a test-
ing image is generated by the owner’s watermarked GAN,
while recall measures the watermark detection accuracy given
a testing image from the owner’s watermarked GAN. Both
precision and recall are calculated based on the bitwise accu-
racy between the owner’s watermark ground truth w and the
detected watermark w′. We elaborate on each below.
Precision. The classification was conducted by threshold-
ing on the bitwise accuracy. Given ProGAN on CelebA, we
looped over 10,000 testing images. Half of the testing images
are positive samples, i.e., generated by the owner’s water-
marked GAN model, and the other half of the images are
negative samples, i.e., either from the real world (counting for
1/6 of the testing images), or generated by a non-watermarked
GAN model (counting for 1/6 of the testing images) or by
another watermarked GAN model different from the owner’s
(counting for 1/6 of the testing images).
In principle, the bitwise accuracy for the negative samples
should resemble that of random guess, the histogram of which
should follow the binomial distribution with parameters n =
100 (the length of watermark) and p = 0.5 (unbiased binary
random guess). In contrast, the bitwise accuracy for the
positive samples should have a much higher value in statistics,
leading to a distinguishable histogram distribution from that
of the negative samples.
We plot and compare the two histograms in Figure 5. They
are visually distinguishable with a significant margin. In terms
of quantitative evaluation, we set the classification threshold
as 0.75, which is around the middle point of the margin. It
means the owner’s watermarked GAN model is verified if the
number of matching bits is more than 75% of the watermark
length. It also derives to set κ= 0.75n = 75 for Section 3.2.4,
which corresponds to a reasonable significance level τ< 10−6
according to Eq. 5. Compared to the ground truth, it results
in 99.67% precision. Consequently, the precision of our wa-
termarking solution is validated and we can move on to more
comprehensive comparisons w.r.t. recall given all the testing
images generated by the owner’s watermarked GAN models.
Recall. We report in the third and fourth columns of Table 1
two metrics to evaluate recall, both the higher the better. In
the watermark bit level, we calculate the mean bitwise ac-
curacy over 10,000 testing images generated by the owner’s
watermarked GAN model. In the instance level, we count
the instance detection accuracy, i.e. the percentage of those
images where the owner’s watermarks are detected. We keep
setting κ= 75 according to the precision calculation. In the
second column of Table 1 we calculate as a reference the
mean bitwise accuracy where the images are the watermarked
GAN training images. In the fifth column, we report as a
reference the p-value (Eq. 5) to accept H0.
Baseline. For comparisons, since there is no existing work
on GAN watermarking, we designed a straightforward base-
line method for an alternative consideration. Instead of wa-
termarking GAN training data, we enforce watermark recon-
struction jointly with GAN training. In another words, we
enforce each generated image to not only look realistic ap-
proximating the real training data, but also contain the owner’s
watermark. Mathematically,
min
G,D
max
Dis
Ez∼N (0,I),x∼realLadv(z,x;G,Dis)
+ηEz∼N (0,I),w∼{0,1}nLBCE(z,w;G,D)
(6)
where G and Dis are the original generator and discrim-
inator in GAN framework, Ladv is the original GAN ob-
jective, and LBCE is adapted from Eq. 2 where we replace
w˜ = D(E(x,w)) with w˜ = D(G(z)). η is a hyper-parameter
to balance the two objective terms. By tuning η we obtained
two extremes of results: either Ladv or LBCE dominates train-
ing. When Ladv dominates, the generated images have high
visual quality but watermark detection is close to random
guess. When LBCE dominates, watermarks are accurately
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Train Gen Instance p-value
Model & Dataset bit acc bit acc acc accept H0
DCGAN MNIST (bsl) 1.00 0.49 0.00 0.61
DCGAN MNIST 1.00 0.97 1.00 < 10−24
ProGAN MNIST 1.00 0.96 1.00 < 10−23
ProGAN CelebA 1.00 0.98 1.00 < 10−26
ProGAN LSUN 1.00 0.93 1.00 < 10−19
Table 1: Two recall evaluations: watermark bitwise accu-
racy of testing images generated by the owner’s watermarked
GAN (third column) and instance detection accuracy of those
images (fourth column). As references, the second column
shows the bitwise accuracy of images that are watermarked
GAN training images; the fifth column shows the p-value to
accept the null hypothesis H0 in Section 3.2.4. The “bsl” row
corresponds to the baseline method subject to Eq. 6 where we
merge watermark reconstruction into GAN training.
detected but the generation quality deteriorates heavily. We
finally report in Table 1 with η = 1.0 where we tended to
guarantee the generation quality.
Results. From Table 1 we summarize:
(1) The watermarking baseline (the “bsl” row) method com-
pletely fails with bitwise accuracy of 0.49, close to binary
random guess, and instance detection accuracy 0.0, equal to
blind rejection. The failure indicates GAN watermarking is
a challenging task. Directly combining a watermarking ob-
jective with GAN training is easily incompatible. In contrast,
our solution of leveraging image steganography and trans-
ferring watermarking from GAN training datasets to GAN
models sidesteps the possible incompatibility and leads to
advantageous performance. See below.
(2) According to the instance accuracy, our watermarking
solution results in perfect detection (100% accuracy) with
negligible p-values to accept the null hypothesis H0. It vali-
dates our effective watermark recall with a significant margin,
agnostic to GAN models and datasets.
(3) According to the bitwise accuracy, our watermarking
solution results in almost saturated accuracy (≥ 93% accu-
racy),i.e., no obvious deterioration from that of the water-
marked training data. It indicates the learning of our wa-
termark generation is effective, with information drops by
≤ 7%.
(4) Refer to the differences of watermark bitwise accuracy,
we notice a GAN model can foster more accurate watermark
detection (≥ 96%) if the original generation task is easier
(MNIST and CelebA against LSUN). We interpret that the
task of learning the watermark becomes entangled with the
task of learning the distribution of real images. The more ef-
fective a GAN model learns the dataset distribution, the more
effective watermarks can be transferred from the training
dataset to the model.
(5) Combining the success in precision and recall mea-
surements, we validate the effectiveness of our watermark
FID FID
Dataset Source (non-watermarked) (watermarked)
CelebA Data 0.60 1.76
CelebA ProGAN 14.09 14.38
LSUN Data 0.61 4.16
LSUN ProGAN 50.74 50.42
Table 2: FID comparisons between samples with or without
watermark.
solution, and validate the transferability of the presence of
watermark from training images to GAN model and then to
generated images.
4.2.2 Fidelity
The fidelity of a watermarked GAN is as critical as the wa-
termarking effectiveness. It requires a watermarked GAN
to preserve its original generation quality. On one hand, the
owner preserves the utility of the service. On the other hand,
it avoids the adversary’s suspect of the existence of the wa-
termark. In principle, the steganography technique we used
should enable this, and we validate it below.
Evaluation. In GAN studies, generation quality is com-
monly evaluated by Fréchet Inception Distance (FID) [36],
which is the major pursuit of most GAN models. It first em-
beds a real reference dataset and a generation set respectively
through a fixed ImageNet-pretrained Inception network [81],
and then measures the Kullback–Leibler divergence [47] of
the two embedding sets as the distance, the smaller the higher
generation quality. We also use FID to evaluate generation
quality and compare between 50,000 images generated by
a watermarked GAN and another 50,000 images generated
by a non-watermarked GAN, in order to validate the fidelity
of the former. To calculate FID in different settings, the real
reference dataset is kept unchanged.
Results. We show in Table 2 the FID comparisons of Pro-
GAN on CelebA or LSUN. As a reference, we report in
the first and third rows the FID of GAN training data, with
or without being watermarked. We find: In the second and
fourth rows, compared to the non-watermarked models, our
watermarked models preserve generation quality with the FID
fluctuating within a range of±2.1%, although, in the first and
third rows, the FID of training data fluctuates much heavily
(±582%). It validates, although watermarking deteriorates
GAN training data, it does not affect the generation fidelity
in practice. This is because the generated results are not as
realistic as the real data, and therefore not as sensitive to
watermarking as the real data. In practice, the generated wa-
termarks are naturally hidden by the original GAN artifacts.
See Figure 6 for demonstrations.
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(a) Original GAN training
samples.
(b) Watermarked GAN
training samples.
(c) Difference between 6a
and 6b (10× magnified).
(d) Samples from the non-
watermarked GAN.
(e) Samples from the water-
marked GAN.
Figure 6: Qualitative comparisons for Table 2. (Top row - CelebA, bottom row - LSUN.)
Attack Watermark detection acc
White-box encoder (strong) 0.946
Unknown encoder (weak) 0.502
Table 3: Watermark detection accuracy of ATS attacks.
4.2.3 Secrecy
The presence of a watermark embedded in a GAN model
should not be easily detected by the adversary, otherwise,
it would be potentially removed by the adversary and con-
fuse the watermark verification. This qualification is more
demanding than fidelity, because high fidelity avoids the ad-
versary’s visual detection while secrecy requires technical
counter-detection against steganalysis.
Attacks and evaluation. In order to design a quantitative
evaluation on secrecy, we consider from the adversary side a
binary classification problem: the presence of watermark in an
image. We propose to make the attack stronger by equipping
the adversary with more knowledge and allow attacks to the
earliest stage of our watermarking pipeline. Namely, we as-
sume the adversary is aware of our steganographic technique
in Section 3.2.1 and proposes to classify if an image sampled
from the real world is watermarked or not. This assumption
favors the adversary side. If the adversary fails to detect the
watermark in GAN training data, it is even more difficult to
detect it from the later stages, because GAN training will
potentially make the presence of watermark more ambiguous
to some extent, according to the drop of watermark bitwise
accuracy in Table 1.
On the adversary side, we follow the attack protocol
in [101] to perform the Artificial Training Sets (ATS) experi-
ment [56]. We target to separate testing images watermarked
0 or 1 time without supervision. The attack is as follows.
We suppose we have another encoder on the adversary side
corresponding to the victim steganographic technique. On
one hand, we regard the original testing images as negative
training samples. On the other hand, we apply the encoder
twice to the testing set to obtain images watermarked 2 or 3
times, which are regarded as positive training samples. Then
we train an SVM classifier [11] using such positive and neg-
ative samples, in order to separate images watermarked 0-1
time or 2-3 times. During testing, we first apply the encoder
once to the testing images so that their ground truths are be-
ing watermarked 1 or 2 times. Then we can use our SVM
to separate them and propagates the predictions back to the
original images.
We consider a strong adversary and a weak adversary,
which are contingent on their knowledge of the victim stegano-
graphic technique. The strong adversary somehow has white-
box access to the owner’s encoder (is aware of the encoder
weights) and is aware of the watermark that was used to gen-
erate watermarked images. Therefore, the adversary can use
the owner’s encoder directly to launch the attack. The weak
adversary is only aware of the architecture and training details
of the owner’s encoder, and therefore, has to train a shadow
encoder from scratch. In our experiments, the shadow en-
coder training is the same as in Section 3.2.1, just different in
initialization.
We evaluate the adversary’s performance on a set of 250
watermarked real images and 250 non-watermarked real im-
ages.
Results. We report the strong and weak adversaries’ classi-
fication accuracy on CelebA in table 3. We find:
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Figure 7: Watermark bitwise accuracy w.r.t. the amount of perturbations. Red dots represent detection on the watermarked GAN
generated samples. Blue dots represent detection on the watermarked GAN training samples, which serve as the upper bound
references for the red dots. (Top row - CelebA, bottom row - LSUN.)
(1) The strong adversary (the first row) achieves watermark
detection with almost perfect accuracy (94.6%) ascribed to
the access to the targeted encoder. It reminds the owner to not
publicize the well-trained encoder after using our watermark-
ing solution. This is a feasible suggestion because publicizing
the GAN model alone is sufficient to provide the generation
service.
(2) The weak adversary (the second row), in contrast, fails
to detect the watermark with just random guess performance
(∼ 50% accuracy) because of lacking access to the targeted
encoder weights. That indicates encoders trained from differ-
ent initialization use different patterns to hide the watermark.
In conclusion, if the owner keeps the weights of the original
encoder private, the presence of watermark in the publicized
GAN model is validated secret from the ATS attack.
4.2.4 Robustness
The adversary may always apply perturbation attacks to the
generated images regardless of the evidence of the watermark.
Therefore, at the owner’s end, the watermark should always
be robustly detected from a possible range of perturbations.
Perturbation attacks and evaluation. In this section we
evaluate the robustness of our watermarking solution against
four types of image perturbations: additive Gaussian noise,
blurring with Gaussian kernel, JPEG compression, and center
cropping. We vary the magnitude of each perturbation, apply
it to the generated images from a watermarked GAN model,
and use the well-trained decoder to detect watermark from
the perturbed images. We evaluate w.r.t. the mean watermark
bitwise accuracy over 10,000 perturbed images from water-
marked ProGAN on either CelebA or LSUN, as we do for
effectiveness evaluation in Section 4.2.1.
Original Gaussian noise Blurring JPEG compression Center cropping
99 bits 77 bits 75 bits 75 bits 80 bits
94 bits 80 bits 83 bits 84 bits 80 bits
Table 4: The number of detected bits (out of 100) from wa-
termarked GAN samples. The detection performs robustly
even when the image quality (utility) heavily deteriorates w.r.t.
each perturbation.
Results. We plot in red dots in Figure 7 and the bitwise
accuracy w.r.t. the magnitude of perturbations. As a reference
for upper bound, we also plot the bitwise accuracy in blue
dots if we apply varying perturbations to the watermarked
GAN training images. Recall in Table 1 the first column, non-
perturbed watermarked training images result in saturated
detection accuracy. We summarize:
(1) For all the perturbations, watermark bitwise accuracy
drops monotonously as we increase the magnitude of pertur-
bation, while for small perturbations accuracy drops rather
slowly. We consider accepting accuracy ≥ 75% according to
the classification threshold in the above precision calculation.
Consequently, we list the general working range w.r.t. each
perturbation: Gaussian noise standard deviation ∼ [0.0,0.05],
Gaussian blur kernel size ∼ [0,5], JPEG compression quality
∼ [50,100], and center cropping size ∼ [86,128], which are
pretty wide ranges in practice.
(2) For the perturbations out of the above working ranges,
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the reference upper bounds drop even faster and the margins
to the testing curves shrink quickly, indicating the detection
deterioration is not factually dominated by GAN training, but
rather by the heavy image quality deterioration.
(3) As a result of (2), the adversary has to deteriorate an
image with strong perturbations in order to suppress the wa-
termark detection not better than random guess (∼ 50% ac-
curacy). However, that also destroys the utility of the service
if the adversary tends to escape from being detected, making
the adversary’s efforts invalid.
(4) As complementary to (3), we demonstrate in Table 4
how each perturbation affects the sample appearance, and how
severely the image quality (utility) deteriorates w.r.t. each
perturbation before the detection turns ineffective.
(5) As a conclusion, our watermarking solution is robust
against four types of perturbations. It leads to wide working
ranges in practice and guarantees that the stolen or misused
service is detected until its utility is heavily perturbed.
4.2.5 Capacity
A watermarking solution should have a large enough capacity
to embed a large amount of information and maintain a large
number of distinctive watermarks for different GAN models.
In our experiments the capacity correlates to the length of the
watermark, i.e., the number of bits n in the watermark. On
one hand, a larger n leads to a larger watermark space and
more likely avoids collision. On the other hand, however, a
larger n may deteriorate the quality of watermarked images,
according to the empirical analysis in [83]. Given the image
size of 128×128×3, it is recommended to use n = 100, as
we have set for the other experiments.
Evaluation. In this section, we propose to explore the
capacity boundary of our watermark space. It is just unnec-
essary to investigate a too large n considering the fidelity.
The analysis is irrelevant to our watermarking pipeline, but
rather the empirical relation between the maximal number
of non-collided watermarks N w.r.t. the watermark length
n. We define the concept of collision as: when two sampled
watermarks have a number of matching bits that is higher
than the verification threshold (≥ 75% as per the setting in
Section 4.2.1).
Given each n, we simulate the watermark sampling process.
We sample watermarks one by one, and check if a watermark
collides against any existing watermark in the database. If
so, we stop the simulation and report the database size as the
maximal value of N; if not, we add the current watermark to
the database and sample the next watermark. We repeat this
simulation 100 times for each n and report the average for
robustness consideration.
Result. For n = 100, we empirically obtain N = 2,355 in
average before the first collision happens. It means our solu-
tion can unambiguously operate 2,355 unique watermarks at
the same time. For n= 200, 300, 500, and 1,000, we are able
Method Seen GAN model Unseen GAN model
Classifier 0.997 0.508
Watermark 1.0 1.0
Table 5: Real/Fake classification accuracy. The first column
corresponds to the scenario where the GAN model used for
training covers that used for testing. The second column is
the opposite scenario which is a more generalized situation.
to increase the database size up to 100,000 without collision.
4.3 Generated image detection
The breakthrough of GANs narrows the gap in visual quality
between generated and real images. That makes the detection
of generated images an increasing challenge. Recent concerns
about deep fakes [26] and misuse of GANs raise demands
for reliable detection methods. In this section, based on the
validated qualifications of our watermarking solution, we
extend it to an application that facilitates detecting samples
from a watermarked GAN, for the purpose of increasing the
margin between real and fake while at no cost of generation
fidelity.
The problem of generated image detection is typically for-
mulated as a binary classification problem: separating real
from fake images. Unlike existing methods that detect in-
trinsic differences between the two classes [94, 100, 24], we
propose to enhance the classification performance by embed-
ding an artificial watermark into generated images, in contrast
to real images which are deterministically non-watermarked.
In particular, we regulate GAN owners to publicize only wa-
termarked GAN models using our solution. Then we convert
the problem to classifying if one image is watermarked or
not. We use the same detection criterion as in Section 4.2.1,
i.e., checking if the detected watermark of a testing image
contains ≥ 75% matching bits to our reference watermark.
Baseline. We compare to a plain convolutional neural net-
work (CNN) classifier as a baseline method, as implemented
in [94]. It is trained on 10,000 CelebA real images and
10,000 images from a watermarked ProGAN. We consider
two scenarios depending on whether or not the GAN model
used for classifier training covers that used for testing.
Results. We report in Table 5 the classification accuracy
over 1,000 CelebA real images and 1,000 images generated
by a watermarked ProGAN. We find:
(1) Real/Fake classification based on watermark performs
equally perfect (∼ 100% accuracy) to that based on CNN
classifier in the seen GAN scenario.
(2) More advantageously, our watermark-based classifier
performs equally well over unseen GAN models while CNN
classifier deteriorates to random guess (∼ 50% accuracy).
This is because CNN classifier is troubled by the domain
gap between training and testing GAN models. In contrast,
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our method enjoys the advantage of being agnostic to GAN
models as it depends only on the presence of watermark rather
than intrinsic information that is overfitting to a closed world
discriminative task.
(3) This proposes a useful practice for DL model adminis-
tration platforms to regulate model publication: publicizing
a watermarked GAN model significantly decreases its deep
fake risks in case of being misused.
4.4 Image-to-GAN attribution
The goal of the image-to-GAN attribution task is to figure
out the GAN model that generated a particular fake image. It
plays an important role in tracing the responsibility of a GAN
model, which provides legal clues for malicious use cases of
fake images. Our watermarking solution, for the purpose of
ownership verification, is qualified in principal for attribution.
This is validated by the transferability of the watermark from
GAN models to generated images.
Closed world scenario. In the closed world scenario, the
model space is finite and known in advance. In our experi-
ment, we train four ProGAN models on CelebA using four
different watermarks. The task is to classify a mixture of
1,000 images evenly generated by these four models. To at-
tribute images using watermarks, we apply our decoder to
detect the watermark in the image, and assign that image to
the GAN with the closest watermark.
Open world scenario. We further consider the open world
scenario to validate if an attribution approach can accurately
reject images from unknown GANs. In our experiment, the
set of GANs is extended to two more watermarked ProGAN
on CelebA, the watermarks of which are unknown. Along
with the original task in the closed world, the new task also
requires to classify 500 additional images evenly generated
by these two GANs, meaning to label them as not belonging
to any of the four known GANs. Our watermarking approach
classifies an image as unknown if and only if the number of
matching bits between the detected watermark and the closest
known watermark is less than κ= 75 out of 100.
Baseline. Yu et al. [94] use a plain CNN classifier to solve
image-to-GAN attribution as a multi-class classification prob-
lem, which is limited to a closed world. We followed their
protocol in the closed world scenario: training over 20,000
images generated evenly by each of the four GANs. We also
extend their method to the open world scenario via training
four one-vs-all-the-others binary classifiers. To train the i-th
classifier we balance our sampling by using 10,000 images
from the i-th GAN and another 10,000 images evenly from
all the other GANs. During testing, all the four classifiers are
applied to an image. We assign to the image the class with the
highest confidence if not all the classifiers reject that image.
Otherwise, we assign the image to the unknown label.
Results. We report in Table 6 the testing attribution accu-
racy. We find similar results to those in Section 4.3:
Method Closed wolrd Open world
Classifier 0.998 0.235
Watermark 1.000 1.000
Table 6: Image attribution accuracy.
(1) Image attribution based on watermark performs equally
perfect (∼ 100% accuracy) to that based on CNN classifier in
the closed world.
(2) More advantageously, our watermarking approach per-
forms equally well in the open world scenario while CNN
classifier deteriorates severely. This is because the four clas-
sifiers generalize poorly to the unknown GANs such that they
attribute less than a quarter of unknown images correctly as
unknown. In contrast, our method enjoys the advantage of
being agnostic to GAN models as it depends only on the pres-
ence of watermark rather than intrinsic information that is
overfitting to a closed world discriminative task.
(3) This proposes a useful practice for DL model adminis-
tration platforms to regulate model publication: publicizing
a watermarked GAN model significantly facilitates image
attribution and responsibility tracking in case the generated
images are misused.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose the first black-box watermarking
solution for protecting the Intelligent Property of generative
adversarial networks. We first analyze the threat model in
the black-box scenario, and formalize five qualifications for
desired watermarking. In our pipeline, we leverage steganog-
raphy techniques to watermark GAN training dataset, transfer
the watermark from the dataset to GAN models, and then
verify the watermark from generated images. In the experi-
ments, we validate the effectiveness (watermark transferabil-
ity), fidelity (no deterioration on generation quality), secrecy
(against steganalysis), robustness (against image perturba-
tions), and large capacity of our solution. Notably, the advan-
tageous performance treats GAN models as an independent
component: watermark embedding is agnostic to GAN details
and watermark verification relies only on accessing the APIs
of black-box GANs. We further extend our watermarking ap-
plications to generated image detection and attribution, which
delivers a practical potential to facilitate forensics against
deep fakes and responsibility tracking of GAN misuse.
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